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(L. A. 19633. ID Bank. Oat. 81, 1"'1 
THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. FRED Y. OY.AllA, a Minor, 
etc., et aI., Appellants. 
(1] Alieu--.PropeJ1J &ichta.-The state baa the righ' to regulate 
the tenure and disposition of real property within ita bound-
aries. It also baa the power, in the absence of a treat, to the 
contrary, to forbid 'he taking or holding of property within 
its limits by aliens. 
(2] Id.-Alien Land Law-Validit7.-The Alien Land Law (Sta's. 
1921, p. lxuili, as amended; 1 Deering's Gen. Lawa, Act 261), 
letting up eligibility to citiJ:enship as a primary etandard, does 
Dot amount to an unconstitutional delegation of legislative 
authority because the determination of some fact or condition 
incorporated in this primary standard rests elsewhere than 
in the Legislature, or because this requirement is measured by 
another standard not under the control of the state and which 
may be subject to change. 
[3] Id.-Alien Land Law-Conve:yances to Ohfldren of Aliens.-
A citizen is not denied any constitutional guarantees because 
his father, an ineligible alien, for the purpose of evading the 
Alien Land Law, attempted to pass title to him. The land. 
having escheated. to the state instanter, the eitizen BOD ae- i 
quired nothing by the conveyance and the Alien Land Law 
took nothing from him. 
[4] ld.-Alien Land Law-Bscheat-Bvidence.-In a proceeding 
to escheat land for violation of the Alien Land Law, the trial I 
court's flnclings in regard to the 'Violation of the statute were • 
supported by evidence that an ineligible alien purchased land I 
[1] See 1 OaLJnr. 927; 2 Am.Jnr. 476. 
[4] See 1 OaJ.lm. IO-Yr. Supp. 207. , 
Kelt. Dig. &eferenees: [1] Aliens, 123; [2] Aliens, 137; [31 ' 
Aliens, § 43; [4, 6, 7, 8] Aliens, 154; [6] Aliens, 112. 
) 
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and OODveyed it to his minor 8On, a Dative-bora eitizen of the 
United States; that a tenant of the lanel bew that the pr0p-
erty belouged to the 8011, and the father W&8 1'1111ning the 
boy's business, but did not bow whether eheeb payiug the 
rent in the SOIl'S name, by whieb the tenaDt had also ]mown 
the father, were made out to the "old IIWl or the JODDg fel-
low"; and that the fAther failed to fl.le 1"8ports required of 
.. gaardian. 
(6) I4.-a'amraliaation.-The 1942 ameudment of the Naturaliza-
tion A.ot (66 State. 182; 8 U.S.C.L 11001), permittiag the 
Daturaliza.tion of every person who honorably served ba the 
armed forces of the United States duriDg t}1e present war 
regarc11_ of rue, did not eliminate the 'basie nqui:rementa 
for naturalization nor make eUgr"ble for eitizeDSbip rrery 
Japanese national 
(8] IcL-Alien x..nd Law-Blcheat.-Where land autolDAtioally 
eacheated to the state for ~olation of the Alien Laud Law 
aDd title then vested in the atate, nbsequent ehangee ba the 
reqni1"8ments for naturalization had no effect on that· title. 
[7] lei. - Alien Land Law-Bscheat-LimitatiODl.-A proeeec1ing 
to escheat land for violation of the Alieu . Land Law is not 
to be barred by any of the statutes of limitations generally 
applicable to civil actions, because the provisions of the maet-
ment are inconsistent with a statute of limitations aDd because 
that intent is shown by the 1945 amendment speeiftoally de-
olariDg that no stRtute of limitations Khan apply to neb pro-
eeeding. 
[8] Id. - Alien Land Law - Bacheat - Laches.-A proceediDg to 
eacheat laDd for violation of the Alien Land Law W&8 Dot 
barred On the ground of laches where nO evidence was pre-
sented tencliDg to prove that aDy injury resulted to clefeDd-
aDta by reason of the lapee of time whieb oeeurrecl before 
tbe commencement of the proeeeding. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Oourt of 
San Diego County. Joe L. Shell, Judge. A1Brmed. 
Proceeding to escheat land. Judgment for plaintiff afBrmed. 
Wirin, Maeno & Tietz, A. L. Wirin and Saburo JUdo 
and Fred Okrand for Appellants. 
Daniel G. MMaha1l, Sherwood Green, Karlin H. Shirley, 
Wayne M. Oollins, Arthur Garfield Hays, Oswald K. Fraen-
k~ James C. Purcell and William B. Ferriter II Amici 
Curiae on behalf of .Ap~t&. 
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Robert W. Kenny, Attorney General, Everett W. Mat-
toon, Deputy Attorney General, Thomas Whelan, District 
Attorney (San Diego), and Duane J. Carnes, Deputy Dis-
trict Attorney, for Respondent. 
Cllester E. Watson, District Attorney (San Joaquin), and 
Robert P. Sullivan, Chief Deputy District Attorney asl Amici Curiae on behalf of Respondent. I· 
EDMONDS, J.-Principally upon the ground that the 
United States Supreme Court has changed the constitu-
tional tests applicable to state legislation such as the Alien 
Land Law (Alien Property Initiative Act of 1920, Stats. 
1921, p. lxxxiii, as amended; 1 Deering's Gen. Laws, Act 
261 J. the validity of that statute is again challenged. An-
other question presented for decision concerns the effect 
of the recent amendment of the federal law which allows, 
under certain circumstances, a member of the Japanese 
race to become a citizen of the United States. 
In the petition filed by the attorney general, he asserted 
that certain real property, by reason of its conveyance in 
violation of the Alien Land Law, has escheated to the state .. 
Two causes of action were pleaded. In the first one, it was 
alleged that Kajiro Oyama. Kohide Oyama, formerly Kohide 
Kushino, and Ririchi Kushino, are of the Japanese race, na-
tives of the Empire of Japan and citizens and subjects of 
that country and, by reason thereof, are not eligible to citi-
zenship under the laws of the United States; that Fred Y. 
Oyama is the son of Kajiro and Kohide Oyama and is of the 
Japanese race but was born in California in 1928; and that 
June Kushino also is of the Japanese race and was born in 
California in 1921. There has never been a treaty permitting 
a native of Japan to acquire an interest in the agricultural 
land of this country. Since 1935, by appointment of the 
Superior Court of the State of California, in and for the 
County of San Diego. Kajiro Oyama has been the duly quali- ! 
tied guardian of the person and estate of Fred Y. Oyama, i 
a minor. June Kushino attained the age of 21 years in 1942 i 
and during her minority, Ririchi Kushino was the guardian; 
of her person and estate. i 
In 1934, the petition continued, Kajiro Oyama and Kohide ' 
Oyama purchased certain agricultural land in San Diego 
County and a purported conveyance of it was made by one 
) 
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Yonezo Oyama to Fred Y. Oyama. The purchase price of 
$4,000 was paid to Y onezo Oyama by Kajiro and Kohide 
Oyama. Upon the execution and delivery of this purported 
deed, Kajiro and Kohide Oyama entered into the possession 
of the property and have ever since occupied and cultivated 
it as their own, and have had in their own right the beneficial 
use and enjoyment of the lands for agricultural purposes. 
The purchase of the property and the taking of the deed in 
the name of Fred Y. Oyama was a mere mlbterfuge, a fraud 
upon the People of the State of California and a violation of 
the Alien Land Law of California. Moreover, these persons 
acted willfully, knowingly and with intent to obtain the own-
ership and use of the agricultural lands for their own use. 
Other allegations of this count were that Kajiro Oyama 
failed to render any account to the superior court for hi'! re-
ceipts and expenditures as guardian, and has not filed any 
annual or other account or report with the Secretary of State 
of California, as required by section 5 of the Alien Land Law. 
No account or report has been filed by the guardian with the 
County Clerk of San Diego County or Rerved upon the district 
attorney, but in conducting business aifecting the land in 
controversy, Kajiro Oyama used the name "Fred Oyama" 
and "Y. Oyama," and maintained checking aecounts in each 
of those names for the purpose of evading and violating 
the Alien Land Law. 
The second cause of action incorporated some of the alle-
gations of the first count, including those having to do with 
the race, nativity, citizenship and status of the parties. It 
then pleaded that in 1937, the Superior Court of the State 
of California, in and for the County of San Diego, in the 
matter of the Guardianship of June Kushino, made an order 
confirming the sale of certain described land in that county 
from her to Fred Y. Oyama for a purchase price of $1,500. 
Upon the making and recording of that order. Kajiro and 
Kohide Oyama entered into possession of the property and 
have since occupied and used it as their own and have had in 
their own right the beneficial use of the land for agricultural 
purposes. All of these acts were done by Kajiro and Kohide 
Oyama, willfully, knowingly and with intent to violate the 
Alien Land Law of the State of California. The prayer of 
the petition was that the land conveyed to Fred Y. Oyama 




respective deeds; also that, as against the state, eaeh of 
the defendants be forever barred from asserting any claim 
or title to either parcel. 
The defendants demurred to the petition upon the 
grounds that it did not state facts sumcient to state a 
cause of action, that the court laeked jurisdiction, that 
the California Alien Land Law is unconstitutional, and I 
that the causes of action are barred by the statutes of limi-
tatioIl8. The demurrer was overruled. 
By &Il8wer, the defendants admitted the race and Japanese 
citizeIl8hip of Kajiro Oyama, Kohide Oyama, and Ririchi 
Kushino, but denied that, by reason thereof, they are not 
eligible to citizenship under the laws of the United States. 
They admitted the pleaded facts as to the birth and race of 
Fred Y. Oyama and .June Kushino, and also the allegatioIl8 
concerning the guardianship proceedings. But the answer 
denied that Kajiro and Kohide Oyama purehased the prop-
erty described in the complaint and asserted that Kajiro 
Oyama provided the money to purchase the two parcels of 
property as a gift to his son. Each of the traIl8&ctioIl8 was 
made in good faith and for the purpose of acquiring for their 
son a means of earning a livelihood and for the further pur-
pose of guarding and husbanding the gift for that purpose. 
The property described in the complaint is agricultural land, 
but Kajiro and Kohide Oyama have not occupied, used or 
eultivated it &R their own nor had the beneficial use of it. 
As an affirmative defense. the defendants alleged that the 
state should not recover because of laches. 
Upon the trial of these issues. John C. Kurfurst was the 
only witness. He testified that he had known the Oyama and 
Kushino families since about 1932. When the Japanese were 
evacuated from the Pacific coast, he rented the land in con-
troversy and. by two eheeks, paid the rent to Fred Oyama. 
These cheeks were returned to him endorsed in that name. 
Kurfurst had never heard the name Kajiro Oyama; he had 
always known the father of the family as "Fred" and stated 
that "everybody else called him Fred." But he had received 
a letter signed "Fred Oyama" notifying him that the prop-
erty was being turned over to a Mr. Kelly although Kurfurst 
had never heard the writer refer to himself by that name. 
Other testimony of Kurfurst was that at one time Oyama, 
senior, said: "Some day the boy will have a good piece of 
property because that is going to be valuable." However, he 
) 
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admitted that in a letter which he wrote, in referring to "Fred 
Yoshihiro Oyama," he meant the son and not the father. Be 
knew that the property belonged to the boy, Fred Oyama, and 
to June Kushino; also that the father was running the boy's 
business. But he did not know whether the checks were made 
out to the "old man or the young fellow" and he did not 
know "whether the boy signed it or Mr. Oyama." 
Evidence of official record!! showed that no reports pursu-
ant to the requirements of the Alien Land Law had been filed 
by the defendants. The mate also proved that in the guard-
ianship proceeding, on two occasions. the father of Fred Y. 
Oyama, as guardian. applied for leave of court to borrow 
money and to mortgage the property as security for the in-
dehtedness. Both applicatioM were granted. 
Upon this evidence the court found all of the facts alleged 
in the petition to be true. The conclusion of law drawn 
from these facts were that, as of 1934 and 1937. respectively, 
title to the two parcelR of real property in question was vested 
in and did escheat to the State of CaHfomia and the defend-
ants were perpetually enjoined from setting up or making 
any claim to the land. The appeal is from that judgment. 
The defendants contend that the Alien Land Law is un-
constitutional because enacted for the purpose of and ad-
ministered in a manner to discriminate against persons solely 
because of race. It iR urged that lUI to both Kajiro Oyama, 
an alien. and Fred Oyama. a citizen, the statute denies due 
process of law as guaranteed by article I. ReCtion 13, of the 
California Constitution, and violateA article I, section 1. of 
the same Constitution which troarantees to all men the right 
to enjoy life, liberty and property. The point is also urged 
that the Alien Land Law constitut~ an unlawful delegation 
of legislative power to the federal government, and that the 
phrase. "ineligible to citizenship" is vague, indefinite and 
constitutes a denial of due process. 
As to Fred Oyama, a citizen, it is argued that the Alien 
Land Law violates the mandate of the California Constitution 
that no citizen or claaR of citizen!! Rhall be "granted privileges 
or immunities which. upon the same terms, shall not be 
granted to all citizens." (Const., art. I, § 21.) Considering 
the statute in its application to both Kajiro and Fred Oyama, 
the defendants continue, it deprive"! them of property without 
due process of law and denies them equal protection of the 
170 PEoPLE tI. OYAJU [29 C.M 
laws and deprives Fred Oyama of privileges and immunities 
as a citizen, all in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to 
the Constitution of the United States. Counsel also contend 
that, although the Alien Land Law has been upheld, the 
United States Supreme Court has changed the constitutional 
test applicable to state legislation discriminating against a 
group and its members because of raee from the "rational 
basis" doctrine to that of "clear and present danger." A deci-
sion approving a statute does not bar a contrary determination 
at another time and under a dllferent set of circumstances. 
Furthermore, by virtue of a recent amendment to the Natu-
ralization Act, persons of Japanese birth no longer are in-
eligible to citizenship solely because of raee, and the Alien 
Land Law is inapplicable to Kajiro Oyama because, if he 
joins the Army, he may become a citizen. 
The defendants also rely upon the statutes of limitations. 
As they state the rights of the parties, by section 312 of the 
Code of Civil Procedure all actions are barred by some statute 
of limitations and the state's claims are barred by the I-year, 
the 3-year, the 4-year and the 10-year statutes of limitations. 
More specifically, the present suit comes within section 340 
of the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 338, subdivision 1 
of the same code also is applicable because this is an "action 
upon a liability created by statute, other than a penalty or 
forfeiture." Moreover, section 338, subdivision 4, of the Code 
of Civil Procedure bars the remedy sinee the effect of the 
judgment is that the defendants acted fraudulently. Section 
343 also applies, and the broad provisions of section 315 of 
the same code include an escheat action. In conclusion, it is 
contended that the doctrine of laches is applicable to each 
cause of action. Two amicus curiae briefs filed on behalf of 
appellants develop in more detail the principal contentions 
in regard to the bar of the statutes of limitations. 
The attorney general stands upon the decision of this court 
and that of the United States Supreme Court upholding the 
constitutionality of the Alien Land Law as a proper exercise 
of the state's police power. It has been the invariable policy 
of the United States, he declares, to discriminate against aliens 
by racial classification for purposes of immigration and natu-
ralization. There is a rational basis for discrimination, and 
the distinction between eligible and ineligible aliens is made 
by federal, not state, statutes. Moreover, the test of a "clear 
and present danger" is limited to fundamental eivil liberties 
Oct. 1946] PEoPLE tI. OYAMA 
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and not to property rights and no evidence was presented 
establishing unconstitutional discrimination. The recent 
amendment to the naturalization laws does not abolish in-
eligibility to citizenship of aliens regardless of race, as the 
defendants contend, but only extends the privilege of natural-
ization to those serving honorably in the armed forces during 
World War TI. Furthermore, since title to the property vested 
in the State of California long prior to the act of Congress 
attempted to be relied upon by the defendants, the later 
legislation can have no effect upon the state's title. 
In regard to the statutes of limitations, the state contends 
that section 340 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not appli-
cable to the recovery of real property and there is neither 
a forfeiture nor the imposition of a penalty under the Alien 
Land Law. Section 338, subdivision I, does not apply, be-
cause no question of "liability" is involved. Subdivision 4 
of the same section deals with actions based upon fraud, 
which is only an incidental issue in the present suit; the gist 
of the action is that the state claims to have title to land and 
the defendants are asserting unfounded claims to it. As to 
section 343 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the bar of that 
statute was not raised by the pleadings and it has no ap-
plication to an escheat proceeding. 
Considering section 315 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 
the attorney genera) takes the position that although there 
is no express language in the Alien Land Law which ex-
cepts its requirements from the operation of other provi-
sions of law, the plain policy of the enactment is wholly 
inconsistent with the application of a statute of limitations 
and the Legislature has so declared in a 1945 amendment 
to the statute. And because there is no showing of any in-
jury by the delay, the doctrine of laches is not applicable, 
and the finding upon that issue is beyond the reach of an 
appellate court. The amicus curiae brief rued upon behalf 
of the state presents substantialIy the same arguments as 
those advanced by the attorney general. 
The Alien Land Law legislates concerning the right to own 
land in this state. The scope of the statute is much broader 
than the acquisition and ownership of land; it includes the 
right to "acquire, possess, enjoy, use, cultivate, occupy, trans-
fer, transmit and inherit real property ... [or to] ... have 




172 PEOPLE v. OVAlU r29C.2d 
This right is given to citizens of the United States and to all 
aliens eligible to become such; aliens who are not eligible to 
citizenship under the laws of the United States can enjoy 
the right only in the manner and to the extent and for the 
purposes prescribed by any treaty existing at the time of the 
enactment of the statute between the government of the 
United States and the nation or country of which the alien 
ia a citizen or subject. (§I 1, 2.) Semon 4 of the statute, 
88 origiDally enacted, denied to an alien parent the right to 
become the guardian of the state of his Dative-born chUd 
and was held invalid. (Briots of YOM, 188 Cat 645 [206 
P. 995].) However, in 1943, the Legislature amended that ,. 
section, allowing the appointment of an alien guardian but ,'; 
preventing such guardian from enjoying, either directly or .~ 
indirectly, the beneficial use of land owned by the minor. '~ 
The new provision requires the guardian to make an annual i 
report to the court showing all moneys expended and re-
ceived, and to serve a copy of such report upon the district 
attorney of the county, together with notice of the hearing" 
of the report. Failure to do 80 renders the guardian punish-
able by he, imprisonment, or both. 
Section 5 directs the guardian to file in the office of the :1 
secretary of state, and in the office of the county clerk of .~ 
each county in which any property is situated, an annual ;1.:':' report describing "property • • • held by him • • • on behalf 
of such alien or minor; . . • the date when each item of such 
property came into his possession or control; An itemized. 
account of all such expenditures, investments, rents, issue.'l 
and profits in respect to the administration and control of ,i 
such property with particular reference to holdings of cor-
porate stock and leases • . • and other agreements in respect 
to land and the handling or sale of products thereof." Vio-
lation of this section is punishable by imprisonment, fine 
or both. 
Section 7 of the statute, 88 amended in 1923, states that ;1 
real property acquired in violation of the act by an ineligibJe " 
alien "shall escheat 88 of the date of such acquiring, to, and ".\' 
become and remain the property of the state of California.", , 
Section 8.5, added in 1945, provides: "No statute of limits- ~ 
tiODS shall apply or operate as a bar to any escheat aetion or _~ 
proceeding now pending or hereafter commenced PUl'Sll&llt 
to the provisions of this act." As a part of the same enact-
ment, the Legislature declared that it .cdoes not constitute a 
Oct. 1946] PEoPLE t7. OYAlL\ 
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change in, but is declaratory of, the preexisting law." (Stats. 
1945, ch. 1136.) 
By other provisions of the legislation, where the property 
interest attempted to be transferred is of such character 
that the ineligible alien "is inhibited from acquiring, pos-
sessing, enjoying, using, cultivating, occupying, transferring, 
transmitting or inheriting it," and if the conveyance is made 
"with intent to prevent, evade or avoid escheat," the "trans-
fer of real property, or of an interest therein, though color-
able in form, shall be void as to the State and the interest 
thereby conveyed as sought to be conveyed ahall escheat to 
the State as of the date of such transfer." (§ 9.) By the 
terms of the same section, a prima facie presumption that 
the conveyance is made with such intent shall arise upon 
proof of: "(a) The taking of the property in the name of a 
person other than the persons mentioned in Section two 
hereof if the consideration is paid or agreed or understood to 
be paid by an alien mentioned in Section two hereof. • • ." 
The determination as to eligibility to citizenship rests 
exclusively with the federal government and is fixed by 
Congress in the naturalization laws. Whomever it endows 
with the right to become a citizen may acquire and own 
land in California. 
Eligibility has been extended to "white persons, persons 
of Mriean nativity or descent, descendants of races indig-
enous to the Western Hemisphere, and Chinese persons or 
persons of Chinese descent" and includes native-born Fili-
pinos having honorable service in our armed forces and 
former citizens who are otherwise eligible. (57 Stats. 601, 
8 U.S.C.A. § 703.) In 1942, the Naturalization A~ was 
amended (56 Stats. 182, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1001) to extend the 
privilege of naturalization to include "any person not a 
citizen, regardless of age, who has served or hereafter serves 
honorably in the military or Daval forces of the United 
States during the present war and who shall have been at 
the time of his enlistment or induction a resident thereof 
and who (a) was lawfully admitted into the United States, 
including its Territories and possessions, or (b) having en-
tered the United States . • • prior to September 1, 1943, 
being unable to establish lawful admission into the United 
States serves honorably in such forces beyond the conti-
nental limits of the United States or has 80 served. ••• " 
) 
) 
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[1] The state has the right to regulate the tenure and 
disposition of real property within its boundaries. (Mott v. 
Cline, 200 Cal. 434 [253 P. 718]; Blythe v. Hinckley, 127 
Cal. 431 (59 P. 787]; Terrace v. Thompson,263 U.S. 197 
[44 S.Ot. 15, 68 L.Ed. 2551; United States v. Foz, 94 U.S. 
315 [24 L.Ed. 1921.) It also has the power, in the absence of 
a treaty to the contrary, to forbid the taking or holding of 
property within its limits by aliens (Mott v. Cline, supra, p. 
447; In re Y. Akado, 188 Cal. 739, 743 [207 P. 245J; Blythe 
v. Hinckley, 81£pra, p. 436; Terrace v. Thompson, tupra, p. 
217) and our Constitution leaves to the Legislature this 
power with regard to all aliens ineligible to eitizenship. 
(Cal. Const., art. I, § 17; In re Y. Akado, tupra, p. 743.) 
The Alien Land Law expressly honors every right vouch-
safed by a treaty between this and another nation. In all 
cases where the right to own land in the United States by 
citizens of a foreign nation is granted by treaty, such right 
is recognized and fully protected. (§ 2.) "The treaty be-
tween the United States and Japan provides that citizens 
of Japan residing in the United States may lease land for 
residential and commercial purposes, but it contains no pro-
vision authorizing an alien of the Japanese race to lease or 
acquire land for agricultural purposes. Consequently the 
initiative alien law . . . prohibits the acquisition by such 
alien of any agricultural land situated in this state." (In re 
Y. Akado, supra, p. 740; see, also, Terrace v. Thompson, 
supra, p. 223; Porterfield v. Webb, 263 U.S. 225, 232 [44 
S.Ct. 21, 68 L.Ed. 278].) The abrogation of this treaty on 
January 26, 1940, has no effect upon the rights of the par-
ties in the present litigation. 
Shortly after the People enacted the Alien Land Law •• 
suit was brought to enjoin the attorney general from en-
forcing its provisions. The plaintiffs complained that they 
had been "unlawfully coerced by • • • threats of prosecution 
from entering into . . . agreements [pertaining to the plant-
ing. cultivating, and farming of certain agricultural lands] 
and . . . thereby deprived of their property without due 
process of law and . . . denied equal protection of the law 
in contravention to the fourteenth amendment of the federal 
constitution." It was held that the legislation does not 
"offend any clause or provision of the state or federal con-
stitution or violate any treaty obligation or right existing be-
tween this country and the empire of Japan." .AB to the 
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validity of certain cropping contracts, the court said, quot-
ing from Webb v. O'Brien, 263 U.S. 313 [44 S.Ct. 112, 68 
L.Ed. 318] : "Conceivably, by the use of sueb contract, the 
population living on and cultivating the fann lands might 
come to be made up largely of ineligible aliens. The allegiance 
of the farmers to the state directly affects its strength and 
safety. (Terrace ef al. v. Thompson, supra.) We think it 
within the power of the state to deny to ineligible aliens the 
privilege so to use agricultural lands within its borders." 
(porterfield v. Webb, 195 Cal. 71 [231 P. 554].) 
The Webb v. O'Brien decision, it was pointed out in this 
case, "rests largely upon broad principles of national safety 
and public welfare. Unquestionably the farming of lands 
by ineligible aliens would give them a use, occupancy, and 
benefit of agricultural lands which in effect would amount 
to a deprivation of its use, enjoyment and occupancy by the 
citizen. Any other theory would be incompatible with the 
occupation of husbandry .... Racial distinctions may fur-
nish legitimate grounds for classifications under some con-
ditions of social 01' governmental ne('e!'l.'lities." (195 Cal. 
at p. 82.) 
In the case of Mott v. Cline, supm, the owner-lessor chal-
lenged the validity of a certain option provision in a lease, 
the contention being that the lessee was an ineligible alien . 
.AB to the constitutionality of the statute, the court said: 
"It has been firmly settled by the decisions of both federal 
and state courts • • . that the adoption of the Alien Land 
Acts was a lawful exercise of the police power. In fact, it 
is the exereise of that power in its highest and truest sense. 
The ownership of the soil by persons morally bound by ob-
ligations of citizenship is vital to the political existence of 
a state. It directly affects its welfare and safety." (200 
Cal. at p. 447.) 
The status of aliens in conneetion with the ownership of 
real property was also considered by the United States 
Supreme Court in Terrace v. Thompson, supra. The court 
. there pointed out that "two classes of aliens inevitably 
resulted from the naturalization laws,-those wbo may and 
those who may not become citizens. The rule established by 
Congress on this subject, in and of itself, furnishes a rea-
sonable basis for elassification in a state law withholding 
from aliens the privilege of land ownership as defined in the 
" "f 
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act." Considering the eontention that an alien land law 
aimilar to our own enacted by the State of Washington was 
repugnant to the due process clause and the equal protection 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the court declared: 
"State legislation applying alike and equally to all aliens, 
withholding from them the right to own land, eannot be said 
to be capricious, or to amount to an arbitrary deprivation of 
liberty or property, or to transgress the due process clause. It 
Upon the subject of equal protection the court held that the 
classi1ication was reasonable, saying that the rule established 
by Congress on the subject of naturalization "in and of 
itself, furnishes a reasonable basis for elassi1ication in a state 
law withholding from aliens the privilege of land ownership 
&I de1lned in the act." The broad basis of the decision hi that 
"one who is not a citizen and cannot become one lacks an 
interest in, and the power to effectually work for the wel-
fare of, the state, and, 10 lacking, the state may rightfully 
deny him the right to own and lease real estate within itR 
boundaries." In another case, the California statute was 
upheld upon these grounds, with the comment that both aets 
were within the police power of the respective states. (Por-
terflsld v. Webb. 263 U.S. 255 [44 S.Ot. 21, 68 L.Ed. 278].) 
Other federal court cases in which the constitutionality of 
the Alien Land Law of California bas been considered 
are: Morrison v. CoJiforrWs, 291 U.s. 82 [54 S.Ot. 281, 78 
L.Ed. 664] (reversing People v. Morrison, 218 Cal. 287 [22 
P.2d718), and declaring section 9a of the Alien Land Law 
nnconstitutional); Cockrill v. CriUfomitJ., 268 U.S. 258 [45 
S.Ot. 490. 69 L.Rd. 944] (sustaining constitutionality of 
the presumption set forth in section 9, subd. (a), of the 
Alien Land Law); Prick v. Webb, 263 U.S. 326 [44 S.Ot. 
115, 68 L.Rd. 323]. 
The defendants rely upon Wut Virginia State BOGra 01 
Educ.ation v. Bameffe, 319 U.S. 624 [63 S.Ot. 1178, 87 L.Ed. 
1628, 147 A.L.R. 674], and 2'AomGI v. CoZZi,.", 323 U.S. 616 
[65 S.Ot. 315, 89 L.Rd. 430], for the proposition tbat mod-
ern doctrines of constitutional law extend the protection of 
the First Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment to 
all eases where the Legislature cannot justiftably ftnd a "clear 
and present danger" as a basis for restricting the liberty of 
the individual. However, Mr. Justice Jackson, speaking for 
the majority in the first of these eases, clearly distinguished 
between the test to be used when dealing with fundamental 
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liberties, whieh include freedoms of epeech, preas, assembly, 
and worship, and other rights. He aaid: "In weighing. argu-
ments of the parties it is important to distinguish between 
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as an 
instrument for transmitting the principles of the First Amend-
ment and those eases in which it is applied for its own uke. 
The teat of legislation which collides with the Fourteenth 
Amendment, because it also collides with the principles of 
the First, is mueh moredeftnite than the test when only the 
Fourteenth is involved. Mueh of the vagueness of the due 
process clause disappears when the speei1ic prohibitiODR of 
the First become its standard. The right of a State to regu-
late, for example, a public utility may weII include, 80 far as 
the due process test is concerned, power to impose all of the 
restrictions whieh a legislature may have a 'rational basis' 
for adopting. But freedoms of speech and of preas, of assem-
bly, and of worship may not be infringed on sueh alender 
grounds. They are susceptible of restrietion only to prevent 
grave and immediate danger to interests which the State 
may lawfully protect. It is important to .note that while it 
is the Fourteenth Amendment which bears direetly upon the 
State it is the more speei1ic limiting principles of the First 
Amendment that 1lnaI1y govern this ease." (319 U.S. at p. 
639.) And in the more recent ease of 2'AomGs v. Colli"", 
.upm, Mr. Justice Rutledge, speaking for the majority, made 
clear that the "clear and present danger" teat Will be ap-
plied only to those fundamental libertieR protected by the 
First Amendment. (See, also, Albuf"1l HolpiftJl V. OM. 
Count", 326 U.S. 207 [66 S.Ot. 61, 90 L.Ed. 6]; CtJlifor-
nill v. f'lwmp80n, 318 U.S. 109 [61 S.Ot. 930, 85 L.Ed. 
1219]; (J/,(Jrk v. PGtil Gray, Inc., 806 U.S. 588 [59 S.Ot. 744, 
88 L.Ed. l00l); Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U.S. 610 [35 
S.Ot. 140, 59 L.Ed. 385]; 38 CalL.Rev. 319.) 
These eases and the decisions of the United States Supreme 
Court previously cited, including f'emJU v. f'Mmp.Dn, aupro, 
and Porterfield v. Webb, aupreJ, limit the teat ofa "clear and 
present danger" to fundamental liberties and do not restrict 
the authority of the state, under its police power, to limit the 
rights of aliens in regard to real property situated within its 
borders. It is su1Ileient if a rational basis is found for the 
classification. And considering the Alien Land Law in con-
nection with the record now before the eourt, there is no 
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evidence that the statute was unconstitutionally applied or 
administered. 
[2] The Legislature of this state has set up eligibility 
to citizenship as a primary standard, and because the 
determination of some fact or condition incorporated in 
this primary standard rests elsewhere than in tbe Legis-
lature, or this requirement is to be measured by another 
standard not under the control of the state and which may ! 
be subject to change, does not amount to an unconstitu-
tional delegation of legislative authority. (Ez parle Gerino, 
143 Cal. 412 [77 P. 166, 66 L.R.A. 249); In ,-e Lasswell, 1 
Cal.App.2d 183 [36 P.2d 678], and cases cited therein; 
People v. Goldfogle, 242 N.Y. 277 [151 N.E. 452].} This 
court and the United States Supreme Court in the cited 
eases have held that the use of the phrase, "ineligible to 
citizenship" does not constitute a denial of due process. 
[8] The property in question passed to the State of 
California by l'eason of deficiencies existing in the ineligible 
alien, and not in the citizen Oyama. The citizen is not de-
nied any constitutional guarantees because an ineligible 
alien, for the purpose of evading the Alien Land Law, at-
tempted to pass title to him. It is the deficiency of the alien 
father and not of the citizen son which is the controlling 
factor: therefore, any constitutional guarantees to which the 
citizen Oyama is entitled may not properly be considered, 
for the deficiency in a person other than himself is the cause 
for the escheat. Property which the citizen never had he 
could not lose, and as the land escheated to the state in-
stanter. he acquired nothing by the conveyance and the 
Alien l.Jand Law took nothing from him. 
(4] The trial court's findings in regard to the violation 
of the statute are fully supported by the evidence. The 
inferences to be drawn from the evidence that the real 
propert~· was conveyed to the son, thereby putting it be-
yond the power of the father to deal with the property 
directly. the father's failure to file the reports required 
of 8 guardian, the unexplained failure of the father, or any 
one of the defendants, to offer himself as a witness, and the 
presumption created by section 9 of the Alien Land Law, 
are ample in this regard. Indeed, this evidence convinc-
ingly points to the conclusion that the minor son had no 
interest in the property, his name being used only as a sub-
terfuge for the purpose of evading the Alien Land Law. 
) 
) 
Oct. 1946] PEOPLE V. On.MA 
[29 C.2c1 164; 173 P.2c1 794J 
179 
[5] The defendants also urge that by the 1942 amendment 
to the Naturalization Act (56 Stats. 182, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1001), 
permitting the naturalization of every person who honorably 
served in the armed forces of the United States during the 
present war. all ineligibility to naturalization based upon 
race was removed. But the clear purpose of Congress in 
granting that privilege to those persons who could not· other-
wise become citizens was to reward military service. Certainly 
the statute does not make eligible to citizenship every Japanese 
national, and those who take advantage of its provisions 
gain that sta~ because of work well done for our country 
and not by reason of having the qualifications to join ita 
armed forces. Following World War 1. the same privilege 
was extended to Filipinos (40 Stats. 542, 8 U.S.C. § 388) 
and it was held that the amendment did not eliminate the 
basic requirements for naturalization; liaR to those not p0s-
sessing such qualifications. the distinction based on color 
and race was not eliminated." (Roque Espiritu De La r.Za 
v. United States. 77 F.2d 988; certiorari denied, 296 U.S. 
575 [56 S.Ot. 138. 80 L.Ed. 406].) The statute relied upon 
by the defendantll in the present ease has the same efteet. 
[6] Another complete answer to the cont.ention of the de.. 
fendant~ in regard to the changes in the requirements for 
naturalization is that, under the Alien Land Law, in 1934 the 
land described in the first count of the complaintautomati-
cally escheated to the state, and as to the property conveyed 
by the estate of June Kushino, escheat occurred three years 
later. Title vested in th(> state upon these dates, and the 
later legislation bas no effect upon that title. 
r'l] The defendants claim that the present proceeding is 
barred by the provi.crions of one or more of the statutes of 
limitation~ generally applicable to civil actions. Primarily, 
thiR defense is based upon section 312 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure which provides: "Civil actions, without excep-
tion. can only be commenced within the perio& prescribed 
in this title. after the cause of action shall have aeerued. 
unles~ where, in special eases, a different limitation is pre-
scribed by statute." But the plain meaning of this section 
iR that the particular statutes of limitations which are found 
in section 315. et seq., of the Code of Civil Procedure may 
be invoked except M to an action authorized by legislation 




may be commenced. .And the "di1ferent limitation" men-
tioned in section 312 clearly should be construed to include 
no limitation as to an action commenced under a 8ta.tute 
which speei1ies that time shall not bar the right to invoke its 
provisions. 
The clear and unmistakable purpose of the Alien Land 
Law at all times since it was enacted by the People as an 
initiative measure has been to place the ownership of real 
property in this state beyond the reach of an alien ineligible 
to citizenship. Not only is such an alien prohibited from ae-
quiring real property, or any interest therein; the 8ta.tute 
expressly provides that he shall not possess, enjoy, use, eulti-
-vate or occupy land. He may DOt convey real property, or 
any interest therein, or ha~ in whole or in part, the bene-
ficial use of land, and any attempted transfer to an in-
e1egible alien is void as to the state. These provisions are 
entirely inconsistent with a statute of limitations; they state 
broad principles of public poliey relating to the ownership 
of J4n,d and declare that any conveyance made in viola-
tion of the mandate of the People shall be void. 
The Legislature of 1945 made this construction certain. 
It declared: "No statute of limitations shall apply or oper-
ate as a bar to any escheat action or proceeding now pend-
ing or hereafter commenced pursuant to the provisions" 
of the Alien Land Law. (§ 8.5.) "The amendment made 
by this act does not constitute a change in, but is declara-
tory of, the preexisting law." (Stats. 1945, ch. 1136, § 2.) 
It is entirely proper for the Legislature to clarify the 
provisions of a statute in this manner, and for the court to 
follow that construction. (Standard Oil Co. .... J O'hM()1f" 24 
Cal.2d 40, 48 [147 P.2d 577]; Union, League Club v. Johfl.-
,()1f" 18 Cal.2d 275, 278-279 [115 P.2d 425].) 
[8] In regard to the speeial defense of laches, the court 
found that the action was not barred upon that ground. The 
record shows that no evidence was presented tending to prove 
that any injury resulted to the defendants by reason of the 
lapse of time which occurred before the commencement of the 
proceeding and the finding is amply justified. ( Ale:tander 
v. State Capitcil Co., 9 Cal.2d 304, 313 [70 P.2d 6191; Bat-
lagh .... WilZiaml, 50 Cal.App.2d 10, 13 [122 P.2d 343].) 
The judgment is aftinned. 
Shenk, J., Spence, J., and Schauer, J., eonea.rrec1. 
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TRAYNOR, J.-I concur in the judgment on the cround 
that the decisions of the United States Supreme Court cited 
in the main opinion are controlling until such time as they 
are reexamined and modUled by that eourt. 
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied November 
25, 1946. Carter, J., TOted for a rehearing. 
